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3 Perspectives on Korea’s External 
Adjustment: Comparison with 
Japan and Taiwan 
Bon Ho Koo and Won-Am Park 
3.1 Introduction 
Current account imbalances among major countries in the first half of the 
1980s were larger than at any time since the early post-World War I1 period. 
In the early 1980s, there was concern about the apparent misalignment of cur- 
rencies, inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies of major countries, and un- 
fair trade practices and exchange rate manipulation by some developing coun- 
tries. In order to correct these imbalances, the Japanese yen rose rapidly after 
the Group of Five’s Plaza Agreement in September 1985. The decline of the 
dollar, however, did not significantly reduce current account imbalances. U.S. 
trade relations with Japan have been the dominant issue in international eco- 
nomic policy. With the yen’s appreciation, more attention was paid to move- 
ment in the balance of payments of the East Asian newly industrializing coun- 
tries (N1Cs)-Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. These countries are 
most often accused of manipulating their exchange rates, taking advantage of 
the yen’s appreciation but not opening up their markets. In particular, U.S.- 
Korean economic relations have been strained by a growing number of con- 
flicts over trade and macroeconomic policy. 
Korea accumulated large current account surpluses during 1986-88, due 
mostly to “three lows”-low dollar, low oil prices, and low international inter- 
est rates. As this good fortune began to disappear after 1989, Korea’s current 
account deteriorated to record a deficit of more than 3 percent of GNP in 1991, 
compared with a surplus of 8.2 percent of GNP at its peak in 1988. This sharp 
turnaround in Korea’s current account is unique in that it reverted to a large 
deficit while Japan and Taiwan, the neighboring nations with which Korea is 
most often compared, maintained their surpluses. The natural question is, Why 
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did Korea’s current account turn so sharply and show a huge deficit in 1991? 
Further questions could be raised: Was such a big turnaround inevitable when 
the “three lows” disappeared after 1989, and was it foreshadowed by the huge 
surpluses during 1986-88? Was it the result of policies aimed at reducing the 
current account surplus in response to foreign pressure and thus avoidable? 
And was it possibly even desirable for Korea to make such a turnaround and 
post a current account deficit? 
This paper deals with these questions by focusing on Korea’s structural ad- 
justment and policy responses after the current account surplus emerged in 
1986. It considers various policy responses made by Korean policymakers and 
accepts the viewpoint that both expenditure-switching and expenditure- 
expanding policies have worked to reduce the current account surplus. Special 
attention is paid to the stabilizing feedbacks of assets markets, in particular 
land and equities, on goods and asset prices and hence on savings and in- 
vestment. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we provide an overview 
of Korea’s current account balance in comparison to those of Japan and Taiwan 
from the perspectives of export-import balance and saving-investment balance, 
respectively. Section 3.3 reviews the actual policy responses to emerging sur- 
pluses in the current account and attempts to evaluate these policies in compar- 
ison to those of Japan and Taiwan. The role of assets markets in the balance of 
payments adjustment is highlighted in section 3.4. In section 3.5, we estimate 
the “conventional” export and import equations and assess the importance of 
adjusting the real exchange rate and domestic and foreign demand. The last 
section pulls the results together for an overall assessment and derives implica- 
tions for future policy debates between the United States and Korea. 
3.2 An Overview of Korea’s Current Account in Comparison with 
Japan and Taiwan 
Fluctuations in the current account can be examined from two different per- 
spectives. One, related to the elasticity of income and relative price, examines 
export and import behavior. The other, related to the income-expenditure ap- 
proach, examines savings and investment behavior as a mirror image of the 
current account. While the former approach takes into account the effect of 
relative prices on trade, the latter approach attempts to distinguish between 
permanent and transitory (disposable) income. Since private consumption re- 
sponds more to changes in permanent income, the latter approach divides pri- 
vate savings into permanent and transitory components. For example, favor- 
able external conditions improve the current account by increasing foreign 
demand or strengthening external competitiveness. They can also boost do- 
mestic savings by increasing transitory income. Whether through improved 
external demand and competitiveness or through enhanced domestic savings 
with temporary changes in domestic demand, changing external and internal 
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conditions may explain the behavior of Korea’s current account. This section 
will examine both approaches and review exports and imports on the one hand 
and savings and investment on the other. 
3.2.1 Exports and Imports 
Figure 3.1, panel A, presents movements in Korea’s current balance for the 
last two decades. It clearly shows that the oil shocks of 1974 and 1979-80 set 
back the current account. But despite these shocks, Korea was almost able 
to balance the current account in 1977 and again in 1985. In order to distin- 
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Fig. 3.1 (continued) C, real trade balance (in 1985 base) 
guish between nominal and real trade balance, changes in trade account were 
divided into changes in the terms of trade and in trade volumes in panels B and 
C. The two oil shocks were associated with drastic deterioration in terms of 
trade, and the “three lows” with its improvement. The real trade balance, which 
is equivalent to real exports minus real imports in 1985 dollars, showed a trend 
of steady improvement up to 1988, except for the years 1977-79. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that large swings in the terms of trade appear to explain, for 
the most part, fluctuations in the current account/GNP ratio until 1988. The 
experiences of Japan and Taiwan are shown in figure 3.2 and figure 3.3, respec- 
tively. The adjustment pattern of the current account in each country looks 
much the same. There was a steady move toward a current account surplus 
before 1985, though it was interrupted by the two oil shocks. 
Movements in the terms of trade, however, differed somewhat among the 
three countries. Fluctuations were larger in Japan than in Korea and Taiwan. 
But in all three countries, the terms of trade showed a trend of deterioration in 
the 1970s and a trend of improvement in the 1980s. Despite the reversed trend 
in the terms of trade, real trade balance improved quite steadily up to 1985. 
This trend was more pronounced in Japan and Taiwan than in Korea. There- 
fore, if there is a secular trend in net real exports due to technological change 
and other structural reasons that is not captured in the conventional export and 
import equations, one may find more evidence for it in Japan and Taiwan than 
in Korea. 
The post-1985 adjustment pattern in trade balance could be characterized 
by a sharp decline in real trade balance with improvement in terms of trade in 
all three countries. In Japan and Taiwan, terms of trade improved sharply dur- 
ing 1986-87, and the decline in real trade balance began in 1986. In contrast, 
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Trade patterns in Japan, 1970-91: A, current accountlGNP ratio; B, 
terms of trade (1985 = 100); C (on p. 58), real trade balance (in 1985 base) 
Source: International Financial Sfatistics (Washington, D.C.: IMF, various issues). 
Korea enjoyed gradual improvements in both terms of trade and real trade bal- 
ance during 1986-88 but experienced a sudden and drastic reduction in real 
trade balance during 1989-91. 
This sharp reduction in real trade balance distinguishes the Korean experi- 
ence with external adjustment from those of Japan and Taiwan. The decrease 
in Korea’s real trade balance shown in figure 3.1, panel C, is so sharp as to be 
called excessive, especially when we consider that Korea’s improvement in real 
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Fig. 3.2 (continued) C, real trade balance (in 1985 base) 
trade balance during 1970-85 was very slow compared with Japan and Taiwan. 
Why did Korea experience such a sharp turnaround in real trade balance 
during 1988-91? The rest of this paper attempts to find some answers that 
emphasize both the expenditure-expanding and expenditure-switching polices 
taken in response to the emerging current account surpluses in Korea. 
3.2.2 Savings and Investment 
We now turn to the gap between income and expenditure. Figure 3.4 shows 
the savings and investment behavior of the private and government sectors and 
the effect of such behavior on Korea’s current account. During the past two 
decades, the current account showed a strong positive correlation with the 
saving-investment balance of the private sector. The government budget was 
also positively correlated with the current account, but its correlation was not 
as strong as that of net private savings (the gap between private savings and 
investment). Net government savings exhibited a strong increasing trend until 
1988. 
In Taiwan, the current account also showed a strong positive correlation with 
the saving-investment balance of the private sector, but a very weak correlation 
with the government budget (figure 3.5). However, the Taiwanese government 
budget did not visibly improve or deteriorate, unlike budget trends in Japan 
and Korea. 
The Japanese case is more subtle. While the current account was strongly 
correlated with private sector savings and investment in Korea and Taiwan, it 
did not show such a strong correlation with net private savings in Japan, as 
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Source: Financial Starisrics (Taipei: Central Bank of China, various issues). 
shown in figure 3.6. The current account was positively correlated with net 
private savings in the 1970s, while the government budget surplus was nega- 
tively correlated with both the current account and net private savings. How- 
ever, this pattern of correlation among the current account, net private savings, 
and government budget certainly changed in the first half of the 1980s. During 
this period, net private savings changed only a little, but the government deficit 
decreased remarkably. Therefore, increases in the Japanese current account in 
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Fig. 3.3 (continued) C, real trade balance (in 1985 base) 
the 1980s correspond to Japanese fiscal policy. This well-known trend in the 
Japanese government budget coupled with the opposite trend in the U.S. bud- 
get has been the basis for the Mundell-Fleming view of both the Japanese 
and US. current accounts in the early 1980s (see Sachs and Roubini 1987; 
Ueda 1988). 
The correlation coefficients among net private savings, net government sav- 
ings, and the current account are reported in table 3.1. They confirm the obser- 
vations on sectoral net savings and their relationships from figures 3.4-3.6. 
While the accounting identity linking budget deficits and the current account 
cannot be denied, budget deficits need not always be reflected in corresponding 
changes in the current account. Related to this point may be the two issues of 
whether budget deficits affect national savings and whether national savings 
affect the current account. Regarding the first issue, an influential school of 
“Ricardian equivalence” argues that government deficits will be offset by in- 
creases in private savings. According to this view, only temporary changes in 
government spending will create current account movements, not permanent 
changes in government spending or any changes in government taxes. Regard- 
ing the second issue, the empirical evidence suggests that the link between 
national savings and the current account has been very weak in OECD coun- 
tries. 
Some very tentative evidence on these two issues is shown in table 3.1. Bud- 
get deficits affected national savings in Korea and Japan to a larger extent than 
in Taiwan. This could imply that if the Ricardian view holds anywhere, it is 
more likely to hold in Taiwan than in Korea or Japan. On the other hand, na- 
tional savings spilled over into current accounts in Korea and Taiwan, but not 
in Japan. Of course, these differing experiences could be explained by the dif- 
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Fig. 3.4 Savings and investment in Korea, 1970-90: A, savings and investment; 
B, net savings (savings - investment) 
Source: National Accounts (Seoul: Bank of Korea, 1991). 
ferent investment behavior in each country, particularly its correlation with sav- 
ings as shown in table 3.1. 
If we pay more attention to the post- 1985 experience, we can recognize sev- 
eral changes in savings and investment behavior. First, private saving- 
investment balance played a great role in reducing current account surpluses 
in all three countries. Even in Japan, the excess of private savings over invest- 
ment as a ratio of GNP declined by 5 percentage points during 1986-89, while 
net government savings increased by 3.5 percentage points during the same 
62 Bon Ho Koo and Won-Am Park 
Q) 
x 15.0- 
0, 
w 
/..--. %., 
...A' 
'.. 
...... 
private investment 
... .. 
......... 5.0 ............. .... 
o . o J n 8  I I 1 ' r a  ~ " " " ~ " " ~  
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 70 79 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 00 89 90 
25.0 
20.0 
15.0 
h - 
c 10.0 
Q) 
2 
5.0 
w 
0.0 
-5.0 
-10.0 
. .   
I : .
net privaie savings 
< 
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 70 79 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 00 09 9( 
Fig. 3.5 Savings and investment in Taiwan, 1970-90: A, savings and 
investment; B, net savings (savings - investment) 
Source; Taiwan Stutistical Dara Book (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, 
1991). 
period, The increasing role of private savings and investment in the post- 1985 
period seems to be related to the post-1985 changes in exchange rates and 
other asset prices. Although no simple model, including the Mundell-Fleming 
model, could explain their movements after 1985, a number of authors have 
emphasized the changes in land and stock prices that were triggered by large 
surpluses in the current account and exchange rate changes. We will return to 
this topic in section 3.4. Increases in land and stock prices encouraged invest- 
ment in construction and facilities and consumption via wealth effects. 
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Source: Annual Report on National Accounts (Tokyo: Economic Planning Agency, 1991). 
Second, fiscal policy played a major role in reducing the current account 
surplus in Korea and Taiwan, but not in Japan. For instance, in Taiwan net 
government savings as a ratio of GNP changed little during 1987-89 but de- 
clined sharply by more than 4 percentage points in 1990. The Korean case is 
almost the same: net government savings changed little during 1988-90 and 
then declined markedly by 2 percentage points in 1991. 
Third, we can find differences in the adjustment of private savings and pri- 
vate investment among the three countries. In Taiwan, private savings played a 
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Table 3.1 Correlation Coefficients for National Savings, Government Budget, 
and Current Account 
Korea Taiwan Japan 
Net private savings vs. current account 0.96 0.97 0.28 
Net government savings vs. national savings 0.88 0.28 0.72 
National savings vs. current account 0.78 0.80 0.03 
National savings vs. national investment 0.67 -0.41 0.88 
Net government savings vs. current account 0.71 -0.14 0.44 
Source: Figs. 3.4-3.6. 
greater role in reducing the surplus than private investment. During 1986-90, 
the private savings ratio declined by 9 percentage points, but the private invest- 
ment ratio increased by only 2 percentage points. Korea’s experience with pri- 
vate savings and investment is in direct contrast with the Taiwanese case in that 
private investment played a greater role than private savings in Korea. While 
the current account surplus fell during 1988-91, the private investment ratio 
increased by about 7.5 percentage points and the private savings ratio de- 
creased by only 1.5 percentage points. In Japan, the private investment ratio 
began to rise after 1986 whereas private savings has continued to decrease 
since the early 1970s. 
These different patterns of adjustment in private savings and private invest- 
ment seem to be attributable to different policy responses to a current account 
surplus. Korea’s high investment and high growth policy accounts for its mod- 
est decreases in private savings compared to Taiwan, which will be discussed 
again in the next section. Empirical studies of savings behavior for Korea point 
to income growth as the major determinant (Collins and Park 1989). Because 
economic growth in Korea was rapid but variable, the perceived income 
growth during the external adjustment period, when the surplus was being re- 
duced, could explain modest changes in private savings. According to the per- 
manent income hypothesis of consumption, if income changes are perceived 
to be transitory, consumption changes little. Thus savings and growth should 
be highly correlated.’ 
3.3 Korea’s Policy Responses to the Current Account Surplus 
As shown in figure 3.1, Korea’s current account moved steadily toward a 
surplus during 1970-85. As the current account surplus materialized in 1986 
and expanded until 1988, one could have safely said that Korea had a structural 
surplus in the current account. Although there is no widely accepted definition 
of a structural surplus, it can be defined as a surplus that can be explained by 
1. Collins (1988) compares savings and investment behavior in Korea and Japan using the 
same reasoning. 
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a structural model and is expected to persist over a few years unless external 
and internal conditions change in an unusual fashion. If Korea had a structural 
surplus, it might have maintained a balance or a small surplus even after the 
“three lows” disappeared. In fact, the current account turned from a surplus of 
8.2 percent of GNP in 1988 to a deficit of 3.1 percent of GNP in 1991. This 
sharp turnaround in the current account undoubtedly challenges the view that 
Korea has a structural surplus in the external account. 
If policymakers believed that Korea had a structural surplus and that the 
mounting surpluses after 1986 were transitory, due to unusually favorable ex- 
ternal conditions, their response to the current account surplus should not have 
been to trim it. Only if they believed that the surplus would persist even under 
the fading of the “three lows,” should they have moved to trim it. 
3.3.1 How Should Korea Have Adjusted? 
It should not be surprising that Korea’s current account turned into a deficit. 
It is natural to have current account deficits after four years of surpluses. Fur- 
thermore, some outsiders such as Balassa and Williamson (1990) and some 
diplomats in the U.S. State Department contended that Korea should eliminate 
its current account surplus.2 So, if Korea’s extended adjustment is considered 
to be very surprising, it is because Korea adjusted extremely rapidly, not be- 
cause its external balance turned into a deficit. The previous section showed 
how rapid Korea’s external adjustment was, particularly in comparison to Ja- 
pan and Taiwan. 
How then should Korea have adjusted to the current account surplus? It is 
certainly a counterfactual exercise that may hold under a specific set of as- 
sumptions on imagined situations. For this reason, we do not carry out count- 
erfactual exercises. Instead, we will recall the policy plans advocated by Ko- 
rean policymakers in the midst of mounting surpluses in the current account 
and compare them with the policies that were actually implemented. As Ko- 
rean Minister of Finance I1 SaKong (1989) and Dornbusch and Park (1987) 
suggested, Korean policymakers seemed to prefer market liberalization to a 
macroeconomic adjustment centering on the exchange rate and fiscal policy. 
The case for market liberalization was that it would eliminate market distor- 
tions and increase imports. The case for abstaining from appreciating the won 
was made in light of labor unrest and sharp increases in domestic wages. How- 
ever, the actual policy responses seemed to be different. We review Korea’s 
actual policy responses in the following subsections, paying special attention 
to whether the initially asserted priorities were maintained. 
2. Balassa and Williamson (1990) argue that Korea would do better to expand investment and 
consumption, with the current account in deficit, because of its high marginal product of capital, 
creditworthiness, and low level of consumption. Searching for the optimal level of investment, 
consumption, and external debt and considering the adjustment costs to negate a simple neoclassi- 
cal proposition that investment should expand until the marginal product of capital is equal to the 
interest rate, Park and Anne (1988) found that an external surplus might be optimal for Korea. 
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3.3.2 Monetary Policies 
With the expansion in the money supply through the external surplus, the 
authorities sought to maintain price stability and appropriate growth by con- 
trolling the money supply. Each year, the authorities set the target range of M, 
growth on the basis of their projections of real economic growth, inflation rate, 
and income velocity of money. Although the M ,  growth rate exceeded the tar- 
get range in some years, money growth was close to the target. However, this 
does not indicate that monetary stances have been restrictive. 
Table 3.2 compares money growth in Korea with that in Japan and Taiwan. 
Korea’s M, growth was maintained well above 18 percent per year during 
1987-91 due to the external surplus, after it registered exceptionally low 
growth of 11.3 percent per year during 1984-85. In contrast, Japan and Taiwan 
experienced a slight increase in money growth during 1986-88 and a sharp 
reduction in recent years. Taiwan’s M ,  growth dwindled to 11 percent in 1990 
and Japan’s M ,  + CD growth shrank strikingly to 3.6 percent in 1991. 
Table 3.3 shows movements in interest rates that may reflect not only mone- 
tary changes but also fiscal changes. Both nominal and real interest rates 
dropped with monetary expansion during 1986-87 in the three countries. Af- 
terwards, both nominal and real interest rates began to rise with monetary con- 
traction. In Korea, nominal interest rates continued to rise with loose monetary 
policy, but this reflects heightened inflation since real interest rates had been 
stabilized. 
As was mentioned before, the interesting thing about Korea’s monetary 
management is that the current account’s slide into deficit did not bring about 
a noticeable reduction in money growth. Table 3.4 shows the sectoral increase 
in Korea’s M ,  supply. The money supply through the external sector, reflecting 
changes in the current account, expanded steadily during 1986-88 and then 
contracted during 1989-90. Money supply through the external sector de- 
creased in 1991. However, this did not lead to a perceivable reduction in money 
growth for the following reasons: 
First, private sector credit expanded considerably after 1989 to meet the in- 
crease in indirect financing by the corporate sector, due to the stock market 
slump. Second, government credit declined after 1987, but less after 1989. Ac- 
tually, the government sector contributed to the money supply in 1991, since 
Table 3.2 Money Growth (daily average balance; % per annum) 
1984-85 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
~~~ ~ 
Korea (M,)  11.3 16.8 18.8 18.8 18.4 21.2 18.6 
Taiwan (M,) 22.6 23.2 26.8 22.1 16.9 11.1 15.4 
Japan (M,  + CD) 8.1 8.7 10.4 11.2 9.9 11.7 3.6 
Sources: Monthly Bulletin (Seoul: Bank of Korea, March 1992); Economic Statistics Monthly 
(Tokyo: Bank of Japan, March 1992); Financial Statistics Monthly (Taipei: Central Bank of China, 
March 1992). 
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Table 3.3 Interest Ratesa (% per annum) 
- 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Nominal Interest Rates Real Interest Ratesb 
Korea Taiwan Japan Korea Taiwan Japan 
14.2 6.3 6.5 
12.8 4.0 4.8 
12.8 4.1 3.5 
14.5 4.9 3.6 
15.2 7.3 4.9 
16.4 10.5 7.2 
18.9 7.4 7.5 
11.7 6.2 4.8 
10.0 3.6 3.9 
8.5 3.3 3.0 
9.2 2.8 2.6 
8.1 4.0 2.9 
8.4 6.4 4.4 
Sources: Monthly Bulletin (Seoul: Bank of Korea, march 1992); Economic Statistics Monthly 
(Tokyo: Bank of  Japan, March 1992); Financial Sratisrics Monthly (Taipei: Central Bank of China, 
March 1992). 
Corporate bond yields for Korea, interbank call loans for Taiwan, and collateral and unconditional 
call rates for Japan. 
bReal interest rates = nominal interest rates - centered 3-year CPI inflation rates. 
Table 3.4 Sectoral Increases in Korea’s M, Supply (end of year; billion won) 
~ ~~~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~ 
Government Credit Private Credit External Sector Other Total 
1985 40 6,462 - 1,595 - 1,047 3,860 
1986 170 6,765 2,424 -4,091 5,268 
1987 - 1,656 6,115 9,030 -7,043 6,446 
1988 -2,174 8,642 10,212 -8,021 8,659 
1989 - 1.993 16,871 2,365 -7,543 9,699 
1990 -1,458 19,068 118 -7,660 10,070 
1991 778 20,840 -3,117 -3,463 15,038 
Source: Monthly Bulletin (Seoul: Bank of Korea, February 1992). 
the budget has been in deficit since 1990. Finally, the “other” sector’s absorp- 
tion declined substantially in 1991; this was associated with the redemption of 
the monetary stabilization bonds. Issues of bonds such as the monetary stabili- 
zation bonds, bonds for foreign exchange balance fund, and treasury bonds 
were the primary tools for monetary control. The most conspicuous use of this 
control was the sharp increase in the issuance of monetary stabilization bonds 
during 1987-88, which was concentrated in secondary banks. However, the 
bearish stock market and the consequent shortage of funds for institutional 
investors necessitated the redemption of these bonds after 1989. 
If monetary restraint is needed for Korea to achieve price stability and stable 
growth, the experiences of Taiwan and Japan suggest that government credit 
should be curtailed and private credit should grow at a moderate rate. In Tai- 
wan, confronted with stock market slumps as is Korea, private credit increased 
moderately but government credit diminished in 1990. The external sector ab- 
sorbed the money supply, but this phenomenon stems from drastic increases in 
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short-term capital outflows rather than from a worsening of the current ac- 
count. The Japanese monetary contraction in 1991 can also be explained by 
drastic decreases in government credit and moderate increases in private credit. 
The external sector did not contribute to the monetary contraction during the 
same year, as the overall balance turned into a surplus for the first time since 
1983. 
3.3.3 Fiscal Policies 
Fiscal expansion is an effective way of reducing the current account in the 
absence of Ricardian equivalence. Table 3.5 shows that Korea’s fiscal policy 
became expansionary after 1989. Government revenue as a percentage of GNP 
increased steadily after 1989. However, government expenditure expanded 
more, resulting in a budget deficit of almost 1 percent of GNP in 1990. This 
was expected since Korea’s fiscal policy has been countercyclical (Corbo and 
Nam 1986). With economic setback and increasing demand for national wel- 
fare in 1989, the government implemented fiscal expansion. 
The importance of fiscal policies can be gathered from Korea’s experiences 
with external adjustment in 1991. As we have seen above, fiscal expansion led 
to monetary expansion. Also, the current account deterioration in 1991 seems 
to be attributable mostly to decreases in net government savings, as net private 
savings changed little in that year. 
The external adjustment in Japan and Taiwan offers another example of the 
importance of fiscal policy. Fiscal policy has been a major determinant of the 
Japanese current account, as the large budget deficits in the 1970s virtually 
disappeared in the 1980s. This has been discussed in the previous section. The 
sharp decline in Taiwan’s net government savings in 1990 offset an increase in 
net private savings. This resulted in a continuous decline in the current account 
surplus as a percentage of GNP in 1990, although there has been little correla- 
tion between the government budget and national savings in Taiwan (see 
table 3.1). 
3.3.4 Exchange Rates and Wages 
Exchange rate policy and its impact on the current account have been a focal 
point of concern for both policymakers and researchers around the world. After 
a decade of huge swings in exchange rates and trade balances in the G-3 coun- 
Table 3.5 Consolidated Public Sector Budget in Korea (% of GNP) 
1980-82 1983-85 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Revenues 19.8 18.6 17.5 17.8 18.3 18.5 18.9 
Expenditure and net lending 23.9 19.9 17.6 17.6 17.0 18.5 19.8 
Surplus -4.1 -1.2 -0.1 0.2 1.3 0.0 -0.9 
Source: Government Finance Staristics in Korea (Seoul: Ministry of Finance, 1991). 
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Fig. 3.7 Real effective exchange rates, 1981-91 
Source: World Financial Markers (New York: Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, various issues). 
Note: The 1991 value is the average up to the third quarter. Higher values mean real 
appreciation. 
tries-the United States, Japan, Germany-the verdict is now that exchange 
rate changes have worked (Krugman 1991). The same verdict could be reached 
in the case of Korea. 
Figure 3.7 shows the movements in real effective exchange rates of Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan using data from Morgan Guaranty Trust instead of our own 
calculations. According to these figures, Japanese real appreciation during 
1985-88 was followed by Taiwanese real appreciation during 1986-89 and 
then by Korean real appreciation during 1987-89. The real effective exchange 
rates of Korea and Taiwan appreciated by 21 percent and 17 percent during 
1986-89 and then returned almost to the 1985 level in 1991. The real effective 
exchange rate of Japan appreciated by 26 percent during 1985-88 and then 
depreciated by 11 percent from 1988 until the third quarter of 1991, so that 
overall it still appreciated compared with the 1985 level. 
The above comparison among the three countries based upon gyrations in 
real effective exchange rates might be misleading once changes in unit labor 
costs are taken into consideration. Table 3.6 reports the annual percent change 
in manufacturing unit labor costs. Although the Korean won showed the lowest 
rate of appreciation vis-8-vis the US.  dollar, the sharp rise in Korea’s wages, 
stemming from political and social changes since 1987, significantly raised 
unit labor costs in won terms. As a result, unit labor costs in dollar terms in all 
three countries rose to almost the same degree in the second half of the 1980s. 
Thus, it is wrong to say that Korea was slow to appreciate its currency in the 
face of the yen’s appreciation. 
In addition, if we consider that Korea relied on real depreciation in the first 
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Table 3.6 Unit Labor Costs in Manufacturing (annual changes; %) 
~~ ~~ 
1979-90 1979-85 1985-90 
Exchange rate (U.S. dollar/ 
national currency) 
United States - 
Japan 3.8 - 1.5 10.5 
Korea -3.4 -9.3 4.2 
Taiwan 2.1 - 1.7 8.2 
- - 
Unit labor cost (dollar 
basis) 
United States 
Japan 
Korea 
Taiwan 
2.1 3.9 -0.1 
4.1 -0.8 10.3 
3.9 - 1.9 11.3 
8.0 5.3 11.4 
Source: Neef and Kask (1991). 
half of the 1980s, it is fair to say that Korea has experienced the sharpest turn- 
around in external competitiveness and real exchange rates in the second half 
of the decade. Undoubtedly, this is responsible for the drastic deterioration in 
the real trade balance shown in figure 3.1. 
3.3.5 Market Opening 
As stated before, Korean policymakers placed top priority on market liberal- 
ization as opposed to rapid appreciation of the won as a means of external 
adjustment. As far as liberalization is concerned, they emphasized trade liber- 
alization more than financial liberalization, following trade-account-first argu- 
ments for opening up the external sector. There is much evidence that Korea 
accelerated both trade and financial liberalization (Kim 1991; Nam 1992; Lee 
1992), although these efforts in the latter half of the 1980s were played down 
by some writers such as Yo0 (1991) and Reisen and Yeches (1991).3 Table 3.7 
shows that import liberalization has been maintained or even accelerated in the 
latter half of the 1980s. However, trade liberalization does not seem to be the 
most important reason for the drastic increase in imports in the latter half of 
the 1980s. In section 3.5, we test whether import liberalization and other policy 
responses have produced a structural break in import equations after 1985 and 
reject such a structural-break hypothesis. To preview the conclusions of section 
3.5, macroeconomic adjustments through expenditure-expanding and expendi- 
ture-switching policies rather than through the microeconomic policy of trade 
liberalization seemed to play the major role in reducing the current account 
after 1988. 
3. According to Yo0 (1991). the apparent consistency in the protection structure seems to indi- 
cate that the strength of the government influences on the protection structure was not substantially 
affected. Reisen aned Yeches (1991). looking at the curb market rates, contend that the degree of 
financial openness declined during 1985-87 and remained below its 1985 peak up to 1990. 
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Table 3.7 Import Liberalization in Korea (%) 
Average Rate Degree of Liberalization 
of Legal Tariffs from Quotas. 
1970 58.5 
1975 48.1 
1980 34.4 
1985 26.4 
1990 14.1 
46.3 
41.6 
51.4 
78.2 
96.4 
Source: Kim (1991). 
*Represents the degree of import liberalization from quotas according to the trade program and 
special laws. It is for the second half of each year in 1970 and 1975 and for the second half of the 
year and the first half of the following year in 1980, 1985, and 1990. 
Why did macroeconomic adjustments to reduce the trade surplus take prece- 
dence over microeconomic reforms to liberalize trade? This can be explained 
by the current practice of bilateral negotiations between the United States and 
Korea. U.S. trade policy has recently been expanded to cover issues such as 
exchange rate and financial policy in Asian countries. The evolution of US.- 
Korea trade frictions into financial policy talks might be understandable if one 
reckons with the complementary trade structure between the United States and 
Korea. Park and Park (1991) among others, by showing that trades among 
the United States, Japan, and East Asian NICs are complementary rather than 
substitutable in nature, argue that the East Asian NIC trade imbalances with 
the United States and Japan will not disappear easily. As U.S. exports to Korea 
are concentrated in natural-resource-based products and highly capital- and 
technology-intensive products, bilateral U.S.-Korean trade imbalances may re- 
main significantly unchanged as long as agricultural trade is restricted and 
modest surpluses in overall trade are maintained.4 However, as Frankel (1991b) 
writes, it is unusual for one nation to include such macroeconomic and sover- 
eign matters as financial and exchange rate policy along with standard trade 
issues when conducting bilateral trade negotiations with another country. 
3.3.6 Investment Policy 
In addition to the above-mentioned policy responses, Korea’s high-growth 
policy played a dominant role in external adjustment. As shown in table 3.8, 
facility investment increased sharply during 1986-87 and was followed by 
sharp increases in construction investment during 1989-90. In the face of eco- 
nomic setbacks in 1989, with sluggish exports and rapid wage hikes, Korea 
relied once again on a high-growth policy by boosting investments. The gov- 
ernment announced the plan for the “new cities” on the outskirts of Seoul. By 
4. Sachs and Boone (1988) argue that the Japanese liberalization of agricultural trade could lead 
to an improvement in the trade balance as Japanese land prices are stabilized, just as the Japanese 
financial liberalization in the early 1980s led to a higher trade surplus. 
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Table 3.8 Growth of Fixed Investment (at constant prices; % per annum) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Korea 
Total fixed investment 
Construction 
Facility 
Total fixed investment 
Construction 
Facility 
Total fixed investment 
Construction 
Facility 
Taiwan 
Japan 
4.7 12.0 16.5 13.4 16.9 24.0 11.9 
4.9 3.1 14.0 13.8 18.5 29.1 11.2 
4.5 23.9 19.4 13.0 15.2 18.4 12.8 
-5.8 10.1 18.6 14.6 15.3 7.7 9.3 
3.6 7.5 12.3 13.2 10.0 7.5 9.4 
-13.8 12.9 24.6 15.8 19.8 7.8 9.1 
5.3 4.8 9.6 11.9 8.9 - - 
1.5 4.2 9.1 8.5 4.2 - - 
11.6 5.6 10.2 16.8 15.3 - - 
Sources: National Accounts (Seoul: Bank of Korea, 1991); Quarterly National Economic Trends 
(Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Account and Statistics, February 1992); Annual Report 
on National Accounts, (Tokyo: Economic Planning Agency, 1991). 
providing more housing, the government was allegedly attempting to stabilize 
housing prices. The government also attempted to increase facility investments 
to expedite structural adjustment and enhance export competitiveness. 
The result was rapid growth in both fixed investment, which increased by 24 
percent in 1990, and construction investment, which rose by 29 percent in the 
same year. The rapid rise in construction investment along with real apprecia- 
tion spurred rapid growth in the production of nontraded goods. This high- 
growth policy, which was induced by large increases in investment, will lead 
to a current account deterioration unless it is completely offset by a rise in 
savings caused by temporary increases in income. 
The rapid growth of construction investment in Korea cannot be attributed 
solely to the government plan for the new cities. The skyrocketing of housing 
prices would certainly have led to such high growth in construction investment 
that the role of assets markets in external adjustment would be strengthened. 
However, since the skyrocketing of housing prices in Taiwan and Japan led to 
relatively moderate growth in construction investment compared with Korea, 
the authorities seemed to have played a crucial role in boosting construction 
investment in Korea. 
3.4 Exchange Rates, Assets Markets, and Current Account 
In the foregoing, we emphasized the role of exchange rates in external ad- 
justment. Besides the conventional Keynesian income-expenditure mecha- 
nism, the effects of real exchange rates on trade flows and of real interest rates 
on savings and investment are important in external adjustment. If frequent 
changes in domestic demand and relative prices lead to temporary changes in 
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real growth, this does not change the permanent portion of consumption, so 
that savings out of increases in income also change frequently. 
In addition to the above-mentioned mechanism in external adjustment, simi- 
lar experiences in the assets markets of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea-for exam- 
ple, the skyrocketing of land and stock prices after 1985-have drawn atten- 
tion to the role of assets markets and wealth in external adjustment. Table 3.9 
shows the movement of land and stock prices in the 1980s. In Korea, stock 
prices soared almost fivefold during 1985-91, but had risen only 30 percent 
during 1980-85. Land prices almost tripled during 1985-91, but had risen ap- 
proximately 60 percent during 1980-85. Japan and Taiwan also witnessed 
sharp increases in land and stock prices in the second half of the 1980s. 
3.4.1 Why Did Land Prices Soar? 
There have been different interpretations regarding the recent rise in land 
and stock prices. Frankel (1991a) attempted to explain high Japanese land and 
stock prices on the basis of the fundamentals valuation equation. According to 
this equation, ruling out the possibility of a speculative bubble, the price of 
land should equal the present discounted value of future rents. If rents are 
expected to grow at rate g, which may be close to the GNP growth rate, then 
the pricehental ratio should be: 
Table 3.9 Increases in Land and Stock Pricesa (% per annum) 
Land Prices 
Nation-wide Stock Prices 
Korea Japanb Korea Japan‘ Taiwan 
1980 11.7 19.3 -9.8 5.4 -2.4 
1981 7.5 14.2 16.1 16.5 0.3 
1982 5.4 7.0 -3.4 -0.7 -13.0 
1983 18.5 2.9 4.7 18.1 37.1 
1984 13.2 4.3 3.3 26.0 33.3 
1985 7.0 8.2 5.3 22.3 - 14.5 
1986 7.3 25.8 64.0 32.7 26.7 
1987 14.7 33.8 83.3 48.3 126.0 
1988 27.5 10.1 66.0 8.7 143.7 
I989 32.0 15.8 32.5 20.4 65.6 
1990 20.6 - - 18.7 -15.2 -21.4 
1991 12.8 - -11.9 - 15.4 -27.3 
Sources: Land Price Statistics (Seoul: Ministry of Construction, December 1991); Annual Reporr 
on National Accounts (Tokyo: Economic Planning Agency, 199 1); Principal Economic Indicators 
(Seoul: Bank of Korea, various issues); Economic Statistics Monthly (Tokyo: Bank of Japan, 
March 1992); Financial Staristics Monthly (Taipei: Central Bank of China, March 1992). 
aAnnual average. 
bValue of land. 
‘Tokyo stock price index compiled by Tokyo Stock Exchange 
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1 
price of landrent = ~ 
r - g’ 
where r is real interest rates. According to this formula, a small percentage 
change in real interest rates or the rental growth rate can explain sharp changes 
in the price of land or the land pricehental ratio. However, as Frankel (1 99 1 a) 
admits, the fundamentals valuation equation does not seem to explain the re- 
cent rise in Japanese land prices, since expectations of future economic growth 
are lower and real interest rates are higher than before. 
A number of authors point out the possibility of a speculative bubble in 
the second half of the 1980s. The Japanese economic boom together with the 
appreciation of the yen was popularly called the “bubble economy.” It is pos- 
sible that the short-term movements of land and stock prices exhibited the 
properties of a speculative bubble when financial markets were characterized 
by saddle-path stability. However, adjustments along the saddle path must be 
distinguished from a speculative bubble, because the former converges into a 
steady state. To make the bubble story more convincing, one must explain not 
only short-term movements, but also medium- to long-term movements in land 
prices. As yet, there seems to be no good model which explains how a specula- 
tive bubble gets started and why it collapses. 
The more popular view is, as Dekle (1991) points out in his comments on 
Frankel (1991a), that excess Japanese liquidity raised land and stock prices. 
The excess liquidity was created by Japan’s loose monetary policy intended to 
prop up the dollar, while the increased exchange rate risk limited capital out- 
flows from Japan. The excess liquidity flowed into the real estate and stock 
markets, bidding up the prices of these assets. 
This explanation for soaring land prices which emphasizes excess liquidity 
and the public’s portfolio choices might even hold for Korea and Taiwan. How- 
ever, the exchange rate could directly affect land prices in these countries, as 
liquidity changes cannot account for changes in the exchange rate under the 
managed float system and capital immobility. Figure 3.8 clearly shows that 
land price movements are closely related to both money growth and currency 
appreciation in Korea. 
In the following, we construct a simple model for Korea’s land prices and 
current account in the framework of a two-sector general equilibrium portfolio 
balance model. The roles of both excess liquidity and the exchange rate are 
highlighted in this model. 
3.4.2 A Model for Korea’s Land Prices and Current Account 
We present a very simple model for Korea’s land prices and current account 
that captures the linkages between assets markets and the real sector. For the 
sake of simplicity, the model assumes full employment, a fixed exchange rate, 
purchasing power parity, rational expectations, and only two assets of domestic 
money and real estate. 
The real exchange rate (4) is defined by the relative price of tradable goods 
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(EPT', for E the nominal exchange rate and PT* the foreign currency price of 
traded goods) and home (nontradable) goods (P"): 
The production (Y) and demand (C)  functions for both goods are specified 
as functions of the real exchange rate (q)  and real wealth (a): 
(3) Y T =  Y T ( q ) ,  Y;  > 0; Y"' YH(q), < 0, 
(4) 
where a subscript denotes differentiation with respect to that variable. 
The real wealth of the public, measured in units of tradable goods, is com- 
posed of domestic money (M) and real estate (3, whose physical stock is fixed 
and whose price is denoted as Pz. 
( 5 )  
CT' CT(q,a), c;< 0, c; > 0; CH = C"(q,a); c; > 0, c; > 0, 
1 
EP 
a = -  T*(M + p z a .  
Equilibrium in the market for home goods (YH = C") requires a negative 
relation between the real wealth of the public and the real exchange rate: 
(6) a = V(q), v, < 0. 
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It is assumed that the domestic money stock changes only with changes in 
international reserves, which in turn adjust to the current account under the 
current Korean practice of concentrating foreign exchange in the vaults of the 
central bank. 
(7) $f = EPT*(Yr - C?) = EPTtf(a),fa < 0. 
The demand for each asset depends on the expected relative rates of return 
on the two assets. Thus, when E is fixed, 
P = p L -  , L ' < O ,  (2 
where p = PVE and m = MIE. 
The system can be represented by a set of state variables rn and p. Figure 3.9 
illustrates the phase diagram for two state variables of real balances and a real 
estate (hereafter referred to as land) premium. When m = 0, equation (7) deter- 
mines the unique steady-state value of real wealth at d. We know from (5) that 
PT*d = m + pZ. Thus, the m = 0 locus is downward-sloping. The p = 0 locus 
should be upward-sloping from (8). Therefore, the saddle path is also upward- 
sloping in figure 3.9. 
3.4.3 Impact of Yen Appreciation, Won Appreciation, and Excess Liquidity 
We now consider the impact of changes in liquidity and exchange rates on 
land prices (more exactly, premiums on the land price) and wealth, which in 
turn influence savings and the current account. 
The yen's appreciation brings about an increase in PT', which represents the 
price of foreign goods in dollars. With an increase in PT', the m = 0 locus shifts 
upward in figure 3.9. The land price premium jumps immediately to point B 
on the new saddle path. As the economy moves toward the new steady state 
along the saddle path, the land price premium continues to increase and the 
real balance increases as the current account improves with the yen's apprecia- 
tion. The land price premium undershoots the steady-state level. 
Next consider the appreciation of the won, whose exchange rate vis-h-vis 
the U.S. dollar was assumed to be fixed. The real balance increases when the 
won appreciates. The land price premium jumps immediately to point C and 
then returns to the initial steady-state level, because the steady-state equilib- 
rium is not affected by the won's appreciation. The land price premium over- 
shoots the steady-state level. The real balance declines with the worsening in 
the current account, as the economy moves along the saddle path. 
The impact of won appreciation following yen appreciation that has actually 
been observed in previous years might be a combination of the two effects 
mentioned above. When the yen appreciates, Korea's current account improves 
with rising land prices. However, as yen appreciation is followed by won ap- 
preciation, land prices shoot up even further. The consequent increases in the 
real value of wealth along with real appreciation worsen the current account. 
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Fig. 3.9 Impact of yen appreciation, won appreciation, and excess liquidity 
Short-term movements in land prices characterized by overshooting may look 
like a speculative bubble, but this overshooting phenomenon of land prices 
must be distinguished from a speculative bubble since the steady-state equilib- 
rium is not affected.5 
We can also explain why excess liquidity bids up land prices. In figure 3.9, 
the impact of the exogenous once-and-for-all increases in money is the same 
as that of won appreciation. The exogenous increases in domestic money stem 
from budget deficits, increased private-sector financing, or deterred capital 
outflows due to exchange rate risk. As we endogenize these money growth 
mechanisms, we can derive deeper implications. However, we do not elaborate 
on these various money supply processes.6 
3.5 The Conventional Econometrics of Korea’s Trade Balance 
In this section, we offer the “conventional” econometric analysis of exports 
and imports, which focuses on the role of income and relative prices. Conven- 
5. Kim and Suh (1991) detected a growing rational bubble in land prices both in Korea and 
Japan. However, they only address the question of whether speculation causes the actual price to 
deviate from a given long-run equilibrium price. 
6. Park (1992) contains a discussion of the relationship between the exchange rate premium and 
inflation in dual exchange markets under various money supply processes, which could be ex- 
tended to our analyses on land prices. 
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tionally, equations for export and import volume include in the right-hand side 
foreign and domestic income variables with no lag and a relative price variable 
with ad hoc lags. There may be caveats about the estimated coefficients for 
income and price elasticities since the demand and supply sides are not mod- 
eled simultaneously (Riedel 1988). Nevertheless, many authors point out that 
the large estimated income elasticities in the demand equations may reflect 
supply-side phenomena (Krugman 1989; Muscatelli, Srinivasan, and Vines 
1990). These conventional demand equations have displayed accurate forecast- 
ing performance and successfully tracked the impact of exchange rates on the 
trade balance (Krugman and Baldwin 1987). 
The equations for export and import volume are estimated from 1973: 1 to 
1985:4 and then tested for a structural break after 1985:4. The equation for 
export price is also estimated to examine Korean exporters' pricing to market. 
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 report the estimation results. The income elasticity of real 
exports and of real nonoil imports are 2.5 and 1, respectively. The price elastic- 
ity of real exports is estimated at 0.3 in the short run (in one quarter) and 2.1 
in the long run (within two years). The price elasticity of real nonoil imports 
is 0.4 in the short run, adding up to 1 within one year. The estimation result for 
Table 3.10 Determinants of Export and Nonoil Import Volume in Koreaa 
Export Nonoil Import 
Volume Volume 
Incomeb 
Real exchange rate' 
(sum of lags) 
Lags: 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
R 2  
D-W 
P 
2.52 (5.43) 
2.10 
0.34 (2.43) 
0.34 (3.11) 
0.34 (3.27) 
0.31 (3.01) 
0.29 (2.68) 
0.23 (2.40) 
0.17 (2.18) 
0.09 (2.02) 
0.99 
2.02 
0.86 (17.15) 
0.97 (11.03) 
-0.98 
-0.41 (-3.37) 
-0.28 (-6.14) 
-0.17 (-3.56) 
-0.09 (-1.40) 
-0.03 (-0.64) 
0.96 
1.48 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
"The equations are estimated in logarithmic form for 1973: 1-1985:4 using second-degree polyno- 
mial distributed lags (PDL), far restrictions. The Cochrane-Orcutt procedures are applied when 
necessary Constant and seasonal dummies are included but not reported. 
b1985 trade-weighted real GNP of the United States, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
for the export equation and nonagricultural real GNF' for import equation. 
'1985 trade-weighted WPI of four countries in dollar terms/export unit price in dollar terms for 
export equation and nonoil import price in won/CPI for import equation. 
79 Perspectives on Korea’s External Adjustment 
Table 3.11 Determinants of Export Prices in Korea’ 
Export Unit 
Price ($) 
Manufacturing wages 0.23 ( 6.67) 
Won’s exchange rate with dollar -0.34 (-7.13) 
Import unit price ($) 0.47 ( 6.10) 
R 2  0.99 
D-W 1.49 
P 0.76 ( 6.03) 
Note; Figures in parentheses are t-values. 
”he equation is estimated in logarithmic form for 1973:l-1985:4 using second-degree PDL, far 
restrictions. The Cochrane-Orcutt procedures are applied when necessary. Constant and seasonal 
dummies are included hut not reported. 
the export price equation shows that the aggregate pass-through rate of ex- 
change rate changes is 34 percent in Korea. 
These tables suggest several interesting points. First, in Korea, income elas- 
ticity turns out to be quite high for exports and relatively low for imports. This 
confirms the theory that fast-growing countries show high income elasticities 
of demand for their exports, while showing low income elasticities of demand 
for imports.’ The high income elasticity of exports implies that U.S. budget 
cuts and the consequent decline in U.S. growth will directly affect Korea’s 
exports and real growth, although the simple Mundell-Fleming transmission 
channel will not work because of capital controls, the weak response of savings 
to real interest rates, and the mild response of exports to the real exchange rate. 
Second, the price elasticity of exports and imports is not low compared with 
U.S. and Japanese figures, although the estimated value of price elasticity de- 
pends on how the real exchange rate is defined. The long-run price elasticities 
of 2 and 1 for exports and imports, respectively, are actually higher than the 
U.S. and Japanese figures reported in Krugman and Baldwin (1987) and Krug- 
man (1991) for the United States, and Ueda (1988) for Japan. This implies that 
external competitiveness or the real exchange rate is important to Korea’s trade 
and resource allocation. 
Finally, Korean exporters pass only 34 percent of exchange rate changes 
through to the dollar price of exports and only 23 percent of wage changes. 
The pass-through rate of Korea’s major competitors in the U.S. market was 
estimated to be 60 percent with the presence of a two-year lag (Mann 1986).* 
7. According to Ueda (1988). Japanese income elasticities for exports and imports are much the 
same as those in Korea. Krugman and Baldwin (1987) shows that U.S. income elasticity for ex- 
ports is as high as 2.5, while that for imports is even higher at approximately 2.8. The more or less 
standard view is that US.  income elasticity for exports is 1.2 and for imports is 1.8 (Krugman 
1991). 
8. Other experiments using a more broadly based exchange rate measure and bilateral trade 
weights produced a long-run pass-through estimate of around 90 percent. 
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Table 3.12 Likelihood Ratio Tests for Structural Break at 19854 
Export Volume Import Volumed Export Unit Price 
CPI WPI 
Likelihood Ratio 15.72* 6.99 13.82b 20.51** 
“Real exchange rate in import equation is defined as import unit price in won currency divided by 
the CPI and WPI, as labeled. 
bSignificance level is 5.5 percent. Thus the hypothesis of no structural break is almost rejected at 
the 5 percent significance level. 
*Hypothesis of no structural break is rejected at the 5 percent significance level. 
**Hypothesis of no structural break is rejected at the 1 percent significance level. 
Profit margins of foreign firms fall below normal levels as the dollar depreci- 
ates and rise above normal levels as it appreciates. To maintain competitiveness 
in foreign markets, Korean exporters must adjust profit margins more than 
foreign competitors do. 
We now turn to the question of whether Korea’s export and import behavior 
and exchange rate pass-through relationships may have changed after the Plaza 
Agreement of September 1985. Table 3.12 shows the test for a structural break 
between the periods 1973: 1-1985:4 and 1986: 1-1991:4.9 The hypothesis of no 
structural break is rejected at the 1 percent significance level in the case of 
export prices and rejected at the 5 percent significance level in the case of 
export volume. Interestingly enough, the test results for import behavior turn 
out to be very sensitive to the choice of domestic price index between CPI 
and WPI. During the pre-1985 period, the choice between the two price in- 
dexes was not important, as both equations tracked the actual performances 
very well. During the post-1985 period, the tracking ability of the import equa- 
tion, which includes the WPI, declined markedly. If the CPI is used, however, 
the hypothesis of no structural break in import behavior is accepted quite well. 
Many people in Korea contend that the rapid expansion in imports after 
1988 stems from such structural changes as accelerated import liberalization, 
as evidenced by the sharp increase in consumer goods imports and the greater 
propensity to import out of increases in income. However, it is very important 
to note that the simple structural break test does not support such a contention. 
If we consider the rapid rise in the CPI relative to the WPI in the post-1985 
era, the rapid expansion of imports in recent years could be well explained by 
the import volume equation, which stresses the effects of income expansion 
9. The break point at the last quarter of 1985 has been chosen somewhat arbitrarily. We obtained 
similar results when we chose 1985:3 or 1986:l as the break point. However, we could not let the 
data alone determine the break point, because developing countries generally suffered from struc- 
tural instabilities. Indeed, the break point of each equation was found well before 1985:4, without 
any relationship to the Plaza Agreement of September 1985. 
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and real appreciation rather than import liberalization and other structural 
changes after 1986. 
Do the structural breaks in Korea’s exports and pricing-to-market behavior 
imply that Korean firms priced to market more frequently in the post-1985 
period than before in order to retain their market position abroad? The answer 
is no. The out-of-sample static forecasts over the post-1985 period traced re- 
markably well the actual numbers of export volume and export unit price. 
Quite contrary to expectations, even the out-of-sample dynamic forecasts un- 
derpredicted actual performances. 
3.6 Concluding Remarks and Prospects 
This paper showed that huge swings in Korea’s current account in the post- 
1985 period could be explained by macroeconomic adjustments rather than 
microeconomic policy. The conventional adjustment policy of both expen- 
diture-expanding and expenditure-switching did work well in Korea, as 
Krugman (1991) argued they did for the G-3 countries. Korea’s responses to 
external surpluses, such as investment policy and other domestic demand- 
expanding policies combined with exchange rate policy, worked remarkably 
well to reduce the external surplus and finally led to a large deficit. This paper 
also emphasized the role of assets markets such as the real estate and stock 
markets, which facilitate adjustments in the real exchange rate. The role played 
by assets markets supplements the conventional view of external adjustment, 
which emphasizes either the Keynesian income-expenditure mechanism or the 
roles played by interest rates and exchange rates in the Mundell-Fleming 
framework. 
What do Korea’s past experiences with external adjustment mean for the 
future? According to our estimates regarding the income elasticity of Korean 
exports (approximately 2.5), future U.S. budget cuts or sluggish world eco- 
nomic growth would have an enormous impact on Korea’s exports. On the 
other hand, if G-5 growth recovers, a good case can be made for a surplus in 
Korea’s current account aided by adopting policies to reduce domestic demand 
and depreciate the real exchange rate. Then the impending issue will be 
whether Korea has a structural surplus with high savings. The related issue 
will be whether Korea’s current account surplus is desirable from the perspec- 
tives of welfare maximization and US-Korea trade frictions. Balassa and Wil- 
liamson (1990) provide some answers to this question, arguing that Korea 
would do better to expand investment with the current account in deficit be- 
cause of its high marginal product of capital, creditworthiness, and trade fric- 
tions with the United States. In a sense, a model that can completely determine 
the optimal level of the current account will never exist. Recommendations for 
high growth are well taken, but there still remains the basic question of why 
high growth with a modest surplus is not desirable. 
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Once a current account surplus emerges, the U.S. Treasury will accuse Ko- 
rea of “manipulating” its exchange rates. What the United States seems to 
mean by accusations of exchange rate manipulation is  that Korea needs to ap- 
preciate its currency more rapidly by liberalizing its financial market. How- 
ever, as Frankel (1991b) asserts, it is perfectly appropriate for  a small country 
to  seek exchange rate stability if it so desires. 
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Comment Bih Jane Liu 
This is a very informative and stimulating paper. It not only studies the differ- 
ent adjustment patterns of current account, real trade balance, and terms of 
trade among Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, but also develops a theoretical model 
to explain the sharp increases in land and stock prices in recent years in Korea. 
I learned a lot from reading this paper. To fulfill my duty as a discussant, I 
would like to raise some questions and also offer some comments and sugges- 
tions. 
My first question is related to the study of the changes in the level of current 
account in this paper. Although the level of current account reflects saving and 
investment behavior on one hand and export and import behavior on the other 
and is hence an important indicator of changes in these behaviors, it may be 
the composition rather than the level of current account that is more crucial in 
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determining the dynamic impacts of current account on the domestic economy. 
For example, the same level of current account but a different composition may 
create dramatically different impacts on the domestic economy. Therefore, to 
study the effects of the current account without looking into the details of 
changes in current account composition may run the risk of missing some im- 
portant information regarding structural change in the economy. 
Another question, which is somewhat related to the first, stems from the 
authors’ apparent preference for Korea to have a modest current account sur- 
plus. What is the rationale for such a preference? As pointed out by Kenen 
(1985) that to pursue a current account surplus may lose efficiency. Moreover, 
a current account surplus says only that trade in goods and services and flows 
in investment income contribute more to the national income at home than 
abroad, but it may not necessarily imply that there is an increase in domestic 
income. Take the trade balance of Taiwan in 1985 as an example. It increased 
significantly in 1985, from U.S. $8.5 billion (U.S.) to $10.6 billion (US.). 
This increase in trade surplus was attributed mainly to the decrease in imports, 
especially those of intermediate materials, capital equipment, and machinery 
due to the slack demand of domestic investment. Thus, 1985 was also the year 
that the Taiwanese government womed about the adverse effects of insufficient 
capital formation on economic growth. 
My second observation concerns this paper’s examination of the fluctuation 
of the current account from two perspectives, export versus import behavior 
and saving versus investment behavior. These two perspectives, in fact, empha- 
size the ability of country-specific factors to explain the adjustment patterns of 
the current account. If we look at figures 3.1-3.3, it seems that the adjustment 
patterns of current account and real balance of trade all look much the same, 
although the adjustment speeds are rather different for the different countries. 
Thus, there are really two questions worth discussing here. One main question 
is, Why do different countries have different adjustment speeds? Or more spe- 
cifically, Why was the adjustment speed of real trade balance in Japan and 
Taiwan before 1989 faster than that in Korea, while the opposite trend holds 
after 1989? This has been discussed in this paper by using country-specific 
factors. The other question is, Why do these three countries exhibit such simi- 
lar adjustment patterns? Some common explanatory factors might exist. As 
we all know, big international events in recent years-the gradual opening of 
mainland China and Eastern European markets, the Gulf war, the unification 
of East and West Germany, and the formation of a single European market- 
have had significant implications not only on politics but also on international 
trade relations and the direction of foreign direct investment. To what extent 
and in what way will these factors influence the adjustment pattern of current 
account? It seems to me that this paper is more concerned with the effects of 
country-specific factors than with those of common international factors. The 
paper would be more complete if common factors could also be taken into ac- 
count. 
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Third, in section 3.5, the authors use the likelihood ratio to test whether 
Korea’s export and import behavior and exchange rate pass-through relation- 
ship have a structural break between the periods 1973-85 and 1986-91. I have 
several questions about this test. 
The first one is why this paper chooses 19854 as the break point. It seems 
that the fact that the real trade balance in Korea turned into surplus in 1985 or 
that the Plaza Agreement was signed in 1985 could not explain why 1985 was 
the year that structural change occurred. I suspect that one may probably obtain 
similar conclusions when choosing 1986:l or 1985:3 as the break point. That 
is, instead of choosing the turning point arbitrarily, why not let the data endoge- 
nously determine the turning point? In fact, the likelihood ratio test can do 
this job. 
The second question has something to do with the limits of the likelihood 
ratio test. As Quandt (1960) pointed out, the likelihood ratio test can be used 
to test the hypothesis that no switch occurs against the single alternative that 
one switch takes place. In other words, the likelihood ratio test can only test 
for abrupt changes and not for gradual changes. Moreover, the acceptance of 
the null hypothesis (i.e., no switch occurs) under the likelihood ratio test may 
not imply that there is no structural change at all, and the rejection of the 
null hypothesis may not imply that the break point studied is the only point 
where structural break has occurred. For these reasons, I would suggest that 
a CUSUM test or CUSUM square test, introduced by Brown, Durbin, and Ev- 
ans (1975), may be more suitable because these tests use recursive residuals 
and thus allow a point-by-point analysis which enables users to see both abrupt 
and gradual changes. In addition, these tests can be used to investigate the 
approximate sample periods in which changes occur. And this can let us test 
whether the structural change in Korea lasted only a short time, say from 1985 
to 1989, and then returned to the original pattern after 1990. Although CU- 
SUM and CUSUM Square tests have some limitations too, these tests may give 
a more complete picture of export and import behavior than the likelihood ratio 
test does. 
Last, in sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, this paper concluded that yen appreciation 
followed by won appreciation caused land prices to soar which in turn 
worsened the current account. Would this result also hold in the case of flexible 
exchange rate with or without the sterilization operation by the central bank? 
And to what extent may the result of this model be used to explain the sharp 
increase of stock and housing prices in Taiwan during 1988-90? 
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Comment Hiroo Taguchi 
The paper by Koo and Park examines from various perspectives the back- 
ground of the turnaround of Korea’s current account balance. The Korean ex- 
perience since the mid-l980s, as they describe it, seems to have much in com- 
mon with that of Japan and, provided my understanding is correct, I agree with 
most of the authors’ basic arguments. 
They argue that microeconomic policy played only a relatively modest role 
in curtailing the current account surplus. This is also true in the Japanese case, 
although action to make the Japanese market more accessible to foreign ex- 
porters is very desirable and may lead to greater horizontal division of labor in 
the long run. 
I also broadly agree with their assessment that the appreciation of the won 
and the yen played an important role in the adjustment process in their respec- 
tive countries. In Japan’s case, the appreciation of the yen after the Plaza 
Agreement and resultant change in relative prices worked in favor of increased 
imports and, with regard to industry, in favor of domestic demand-oriented 
industries, notably services, which is where the investment boom of the late 
1980s in Japan saw its origins. This shift of resources toward domestic 
demand-oriented industries contributed, at least in the short run, to a decrease 
in the trade and current account balances. However, the long-term impact is 
less obvious. While investment in service industries does not directly increase 
export capacity, it may in the long run have a positive impact on exports by 
promoting the efficiency of the economy as a whole and, by stabilizing overall 
price levels, may assist in stabilizing wages. 
Another important common feature is that the turnaround in respective cur- 
rent accounts stemmed from increases in overall private investment in the late 
1980s. Rises in asset prices are likely to have contributed in both Korea and 
Japan. However, the similarity between developments in Japan and Korea 
seems to end there. 
As I understand it, in the last several years, there has been quite a difference 
in the basic strategy of monetary policy in Korea and Japan. Korea, facing a 
decrease in export growth as a result of the appreciation of the won, relaxed 
monetary policy in late 1989. The official discount rate was lowered from 8 to 
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7 percent, and while nominal interest remained high, this was due to higher 
inflation, as Koo and Park rightly point out in their paper. 
On the surface, this resembles the now much-criticized monetary policy ac- 
tion in Japan in the aftermath of the substantial appreciation of the yen. How- 
ever, an important difference is that prices and wages were extremely stable in 
Japan at that time. Japan’s year-on-year CPI inflation rate was actually negative 
when the Bank of Japan lowered the official discount rate (ODR) in early 1987, 
and it remained at around zero for quite a long time thereafter. In Korea, the 
corresponding figure had risen from 5.5 to 6 percent before the ODR was low- 
ered in 1989, and it continued to rise thereafter. Referring to table 3.6, Koo 
and Park argue that the won’s appreciation was not small if the increase in unit 
labor cost (ULC) is taken into account. They may be right. But I am tempted 
to read that table in a slightly different way: wages and ULC in Korea main- 
tained a high tempo of increase despite the appreciation of the won. This devel- 
opment, at least to me, seems to have stemmed from easy monetary policy and 
was the fundamental reason why Korea’s current account balance turned 
around so suddenly. 
I do not intend to argue that that was wrong, since I am not able to evaluate 
Korea’s long-term growth potential; neither am I sufficiently informed about 
the social and political background, The only thing I would like to say is that 
this reaction to the appreciation of the won resembles Japan’s policy reaction 
to the appreciation of the yen in 1970, when Japan tried to inflate away the 
current account surplus, which I believe was a serious mistake. 
This brings me to the normative aspects regarding current account adjust- 
ments. It was not clear, at least not to me, whether the authors believed that 
adjustment was necessary, or to what degree desirable. Is it not possible to 
argue that it would have been better for the long-term development of Korea if 
it had maintained the surplus and avoided accelerated inflation and responded 
to foreign pressure by liberalizing goods and capital markets more rigorously? 
Putting a related question from a different angle, in Japan’s case it is often 
maintained, and I have certain sympathy with the view, that it is natural and 
desirable from a global point of view that Japan is recording current account 
surpluses at this moment, considering that its population is aging rapidly, a fact 
which will very likely lead to a considerable drop in net savings in the early 
twenty-first century. I think it would be very interesting to hear whether similar 
arguments for the desirability of maintaining a current account surplus exist in 
Korea and, if so, what Koo and Park’s views are. 
My final comments pertain to the pricing behavior of firms. In chapter 5 of 
this volume, which discusses the price elasticity of Korea’s trade, Jwa argues 
that Korean exporters have to adjust profit margins more than foreign competi- 
tors do. It was, however, not clear to me why they have to do so. I would like 
the authors to elaborate somewhat more on this point. Moreover, since a major 
objective of the paper is to review the Korean experience in comparison with 
those of Japan and Taiwan, it would enrich the study if they compared Korea’s 
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pricing strategy with those in Japan and Taiwan. This should be particularly 
interesting because industrial structure, especially of export industries, differs 
quite considerably among these three countries: in Korea, a small number of 
giant industrial groups dominate the economy, Taiwan is characterized by 
many small, independent firms, and Japan’s industrial structure lies some- 
where between. 
